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POPE V. ILLINOIS: SUGGESTIONS FOR CIVIL
REGULATIONS OF NON-OBSCENE
PORNOGRAPHIC MATERIAL AND ADULT
BUSINESSES
DENNIS H. STAFFELBACH*
Twenty years ago, Justice Harlan bemoaned the "intracta-
ble obscenity problem."' In the spring of 1987, however, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the legal definition of
obscenity that has existed for fifteen years. In Pope v. Illinois,2
the Court reaffirmed the tripartite test for obscenity set forth in
Miller v. California' and later clarified in Smith v. United States.4
At first blush, Pope reassures state and local legislatures, which
adopted a Miller type obscenity test, that their statutes are con-
stitutional. The decision also seems encouraging to law
enforcement officials who have successfully attained criminal
obscenity convictions under such legislation. But a closer anal-
ysis of the decision indicates that such reassurances are not
warranted.
Ever since the Supreme Court stripped obscenity of its
protected speech status in Roth v. United States,5 the Justices
have been sharply divided concerning a legal definition of
obscenity. They also have been divided on whether penal sanc-
tions should be leveled against those found dealing in this
material. The Court in Pope was no different. The "intractable
obscenity problem" split the Court 5-4 once again, resulting in
five different opinions. Proponents of the present obscenity
laws should also not rely on the younger and avowedly more
conservative members of the Court to join ranks faithfully in
combatting obscenity via a criminal prosecutorial route. Justice
Scalia wrote: "[I]t is quite impossible to come to an objective
assessment of (at least) literary or artistic value [of allegedly
* B.A. 1980, University of Hawaii; M.A. 1982, University of Notre
Dame; J.D. 1989, University of Notre Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1987-89.
To my wife.
1. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2. Pope v. Illinois, 107 S.Ct. 1918 (1987).
3. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
4. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
5. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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obscene material] .... Just as there is no use arguing about
taste, there is no use litigating about it." 6 Scalia's'argument
seems to echo Justice Stevens's opinion in Pope, which main-
tained that the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant in an
obscenity trial should not be "determined primarily by individ-
ual jurors' subjective reactions to the materials in question
.... -' The only significant difference between the Scalia and
Stevens opinions is that Scalia concurred with the majority and
Stevens dissented. Justice Scalia concluded his opinion by can-
didly suggesting the need to reexamine Miller.8
Pope, therefore, does not provide much reassurance for
communities that have relied on criminal prosecution of
obscenity to protect their citizens from the massive prolifera-
tion of sexually explicit material. This comment delineates civil
restrictions as alternatives to criminal remedies. Civil sanctions
have two distinct advantages over criminal sanctions: they can
be tailored to fit a particular community's need, and they have
consistently passed constitutional scrutiny. Possibly the most
important advantage of civil sanctions is that they are highly
effective in restricting the availability of both obscene and por-
nographic material.
Part I of this comment summarizies and analyzes the Pope
decision. The Court's rationale for its continued disinclination
to criminalize production and distribution of obscene material
will be emphasized. It then focuses on Justice Stevens's sug-
gestions for civil alternatives restricting the dissemination of
pornographic material that may or may not be legally obscene.
The difference between pornographic and obscene material is
one of degrees. Obscenity is essentially hard-core pornogra-
phy. A pornographic work will be deemed obscene and conse-
quently not protected by the first amendment, if (1) it appeals
to a prurient interest in sex, (2) it is patently offensive, and (3)
it lacks social value.9 Part II presents the constitutional basis
for a community's right to impose civil regulations on the dis-
tribution of sexually explicit material. This argument will be
grounded in three lines of Supreme Court zoning decisions.
These opinions have held that a state's interest in protecting
property values, privacy and family rights, and the quality of its
living environment, even in protecting a community's aesthetic
6. Pope v. Illinois, 107 S.Ct. at 1923 (Scalia, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 1928 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 1923 (Scalia, J., concurring).
9. See infra text accompanying note 10, for a complete definition of
obscenity based on the Supreme Court decision, Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973).
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beauty, are legitimate values that may outweigh other first
amendment rights. Part III examines recent decisions that
uphold the constitutionality of statutes actually regulating the
commercial dissemination of pornography. Finally, these deci-
sions will be practically analyzed and applied providing an out-
line for an effective and constitutional ordinance. The focus of
this legislation is in two general areas: (1) regulating sexually
oriented businesses and (2) restricting the public display of
pornographic material found harmful to minors.
I. POPE V. ILLINOIS
A. Legal Analysis of Pope v. Illinois
In Pope v. Illinois, the Court barely reaffirmed the Miller def-
inition of obscenity, which provides that a work is legally
obscene if (1) the average person applying "contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (2) the work is
patently offensive; and, (3) the material, based on a reasonable
person standard, lacks any serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific (LAPS) value.'° The central issue in Pope was whether
a "statewide community standard," the standard used by the
trial court, could determine the LAPS value of the allegedly
obscene magazines or whether the trial court should have
applied the "reasonable person" standard." The issue, how-
ever, was somewhat blurred because the Illinois obscenity stat-
ute had not incorporated the language of the Miller test,
namely, that a work must lack any LAPS value. Instead of
utilizing the Miller LAPS test, Illinois adopted a stricter stan-
dard. A work, to be obscene, would have to be "utterly without
redeeming social value," a standard first set forth in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts,'2 and abandoned in Miller. On appeal the
Supreme Court of Illinois found itself in a difficult position. In
a later opinion, Smith v. United States,' 3 the United States
Supreme Court held that the reasonable person standard not
community standards, should be used to determine a work's
10. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291 (1977), the Court clarified Miller and ruled that only the first
two parts of the test should be judged according to "contemporary
community standards." Id. at 301. The "serious value" criterion, the Court
maintained, should not be determined with reference to community
standards, but instead the standard should be whether reasonable persons
would find value in the material. Id. at 302-03.
11. Pope v. Illinois, 107 S.Ct. 1918 (1987).
12. 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).
13. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
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social LAPS value.' 4 In Pope,'5 the trial court applied a commu-
nity standard test, not as to whether the allegedly obscene work
had any serious LAPS value but whether it was "utterly without
redeeming social value."'16 Because the Supreme Court aban-
doned the "utterly without redeeming social value" test in
Miller, it obviously did not have an occasion or a need to decide
whether the objective reasonableness standard should apply to
the forsaken Memoirs test. Therefore, the appellate court did
not have direct Supreme Court precedent to guide its decision.
As a result, it held that because Illinois adopted a stricter value
standard, it may apply a statewide community standard to
determine the value of the allegedly obscene magazines in
question.' 7 The Illinois Supreme Court refused to review the
appellate court's decision and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.' 8
Justice White, writing for the five-person majority, dis-
agreed with the appellate court's application of the community
standard to the third-part value test of the obscenity determina-
tion. 9 White reasoned that states are relatively free to choose
the "expression" for the value test. States may adopt either the
strict "utterly without redeeming social value" test or a "lack-
ing serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value" test.
2 0
Regardless of which expression a state enacts, the work's social
value must still be decided by an objective standard, namely the
reasonable person standard.2' "There is no suggestion in our
cases that the question of the value of an allegedly obscene
work is to be determined by reference to community stan-
dards."22 Clearly the Court did not want a work's value to be
determined by the subjective values of individual communities.
The reasonable person standard is stricter, analogous to a
national standard, and provides more protection for the alleg-
edly obscene material. Justice White wrote: "Just as the ideas
a work represents need not obtain majority approval to merit
protection, neither, insofar as the First Amendment is con-
cerned, does the value of the work vary from community to
14. Id. at 301-02.
15. The Supreme Court consolidated two Illinois Supreme Court
decisions, People v. Pope, 486 N.E.2d (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 1985), and People v.
Morrison, 486 N.E.2d 345 (I1. App. 2 Dist. 1985).
16. 486 N.E.2d at 355.
17. Id.
18. Pope v. Illinois, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1920 (1987).
19. Id. at 1920-21.
20. Id. at 1920 n. 1.
21. Id. at 1920-21.
22. Id. at 1920.
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community based on the degree of local acceptance it has
won."
23
The statewide standard of Illinois was applied in both the
Illinois Supreme Court decisions of Pope and Morrison. 4 The
United States Supreme Court remanded to the lower court to
determine whether the application of a statewide community
standard test constituted harmless error. The Court stated,
however, "We see no reason to require a retrial if it can be said
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict in this case
was not affected by the erroneous instruction.- 25
Justice Stevens, joined 26 by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissented from the majority in three distinct areas: "(1) the
error in the [jury] instruction was not harmless; (2) the Court's
attempt to clarify the constitutional definition of obscenity is
not faithful to the First Amendment; and (3) . . .Illinois may
[not] criminalize the sale of magazines to consenting adults
who enjoy the constitutional right to read and possess them."21 7
In Part One of his dissent, Stevens maintained that the trial
judge's jury instructions regarding the third part of the Miller
test was reversible error. The trial court instructed the jury to
determine the social value of the magazines in question based
on whether ordinary adults in the whole state of Illinois would
consider the magazines that petitioners sold as having value.28
Stevens argued that the difference between a "statewide com-
munity standard" and an objective standard is simply too great.
Because the petitioners "were denied a jury determination on
one of the critical elements of an obscenity prosecution ' 29 the
conviction should be reversed. Justices Blackmun, Marshall,
and Brennan agreed with this final contention.3" While the
reversible error issue was certainly important to this case, it is
23. Id. at 1921.
24. People v. Pope, 486 N.E.2d 350, 359-60 (Ill. App. 2 Dist 1985), and
People v. Morrison, 486 N.E.2d 345, 348-49 (11. App. 2 Dist. 1985).
25. Pope v. Illinois, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1922 (1987).
26. Id. at 1924-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although Justice Blackmun
joined the slim majority in the seminal cases that defined obscenity, he could
not be counted among the majority in Pope. Blackmun concurred with White
in reaffirming the Miller obscenity definition, but he sided with Justice
Stevens's lengthy dissent in Pope. In his dissent, Blackmun maintained that
erroneous jury instructions regarding the third prong of the Miller test could
not be harmless error in this case.
27. Id. at 1924 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan wrote a separate
dissenting opinion but agreed with Justice Stevens in this regard.
28. Id. at 1925 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1925 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 1923-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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less important to this student comment. For our concerns, Ste-
vens's suggested redefinition of obscenity is somewhat more
significant; most central to this discussion is his suggested use
of civil sanctions to restrict pornographic speech.3 '
In Part Two of his dissent, Stevens offered an alternative
third prong to the obscenity test. He argued that the inquiry
should not be whether a reasonable person would, but could, find
literary, artistic, political or scientific value in the material.32
Stevens argued that the standard promulgated by the majority
might lead jurors to believe that "reasonableness" should be
equated with what the majority of the population believe to be
reasonable. 33 "A juror.., might well believe that the majority
of the population who find no value in such a book are more
reasonable that the minority who do find value. First Amend-
ment protection surely must not be contingent on this type of
subjective determination."3 4 Justice Scalia, in his concurring
opinion, thought Stevens's "modified reasonable person stan-
dard" only obfuscated an already difficult legal definition.
Scalia maintained that a juror already has difficulty deciding
how the "reasonable person" would judge the value of an alleg-
edly obscene work; but to ask a juror whether a reasonable per-
son could find value in a work is to carry "refinement to the
point of meaninglessness. 35
In Part Three of Stevens's dissent, he pointed out that only
a slim majority of the Court has ever agreed that the govern-
ment may constitutionally criminalize the possession or sale of
obscene literature.3 6 He observed that in "recent years" six
members of the Court have expressed the opinion that the first
amendment, at the very least, precludes criminal prosecution
for sales such as those involved in this case.3 7 The gist of his
argument is that to establish a sufficiently clear definition of
obscenity is impossible. Consequently, distributors of pornog-
raphy will never be able to distinguish between constitutionally
protected material from illegal obscene material. Potential
criminal defendants have no certainty of the legality of their
sales; only in a criminal trial will this certainty be revealed. 8
Stevens concluded that any statutory definition of obscenity
31. Id. at 1924-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 1927 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 1927 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 1927 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
35. Id. at 1923 (Scalia, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 1927 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 1927 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1928-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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would fail on the grounds of vagueness: "[I]n the final analysis,
the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant in an obscenity
trial is determined primarily by individual jurors' subjective
reactions to the materials in question rather than by the pre-
dictable application of rules of law." '39 He continued: "The
Constitution cannot tolerate schemes that criminalize catego-
ries of speech that the Court has conceded to be so vague and
uncertain that they cannot 'be defined legislatively.' "40
Those who favor the criminal prosecution of obscenity can
take little security from Pope. Although the Court did reaffirm a
now fifteen-year-old definition of obscenity, an equal number
of Supreme Court Justices presently consider the Miller defini-
tion inadequate. Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall
forthrightly objected to the criminal prosecution of obscenity
on the grounds that a legal definition of obscenity inevitably
would be vague and have a chilling effect on the dissemination
of constitutionally protected material.4 Justice Scalia, without
addressing the issues of criminal prosecution or civil sanctions,
agreed. He wrote:
[I]n my view it is quite impossible to come to an objective
assessment of (at least) literary or artistic value .... Since
ratiocination has little to do with esthetics, the fabled
"reasonable man" is of little help in this inquiry . . . . I
think we would be better advised to adopt as a legal
maxim what has long been the wisdom of mankind: De
gustibus non est disputandum. Just as there is no use arguing
about taste, there is no use litigating about it. For the law
courts to decide 'What is Beauty' is a novelty even by
today's standards.
All of today's opinions, I suggest, display the need
for reexamination of Miller.
4 2
Justice Scalia's concurrence should be viewed as a harbin-
ger of caution. It may indicate that the next time the Court
reviews an obscenity case he may swing with the dissent, which
would cause a significant modification or overruling of Miller.
The next Supreme Court obscenity decision may rudely
awaken those communities and states dependent on criminal
sanctions to combat the proliferation of obscenity. A reversal
39. Id. at 1928 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing his dissenting opinion in
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316 (1976)).
40. Id. at 1929-30 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing Smith, 431 U.S. at 303).
41. Id. at 1924-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1923 (Scalia, J., concurring).
1989]
138 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LA W, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 4
of Miller will be even more damaging if they have no alternative
legislation that provides civil restrictions on the distribution of
sexually explicit material.
B. The Civil Sanctions Alternative
The criminal prosecution of obscenity is tenuously depen-
dent on the Supreme Court providing a comprehensible defini-
tion of obscenity. Criminal prosecution, however, is only one
weapon public officials may use to fight the purveyors of por-
nography. A variety of civil sanctions are available that are
more effective and efficient than their penal counterparts. Jus-
tice Stevens, in his dissent in Pope, encouraged states to con-
centrate on civil remedies:
The insurmountable vagueness problems involved in
criminalization are not, in my view, implicated with
respect to civil regulation of sexually explicit material, an
area in which the States retain substantial leeway. More-
over, as long as it [a state's regulation] does not deny
"access to the market," and allows "the viewing public"
to "satisfy its appetite for sexually explicit fare;" I believe
that the state may regulate the sale and exhibition of even
non-obscene material. As for prohibiting sale or exhibi-
tion of sexually explicit matter to minors or material con-
taining depictions of minors, it has long been established
that the state may go beyond the constitutional definition
of obscenity.4"
Justice Stevens cited a number of recent Court decisions to
support his contention that the first amendment is more ame-
nable to the civil restriction of sexually explicit material than to
the criminal conviction of its proprietors. Stevens referred to a
line of decisions upholding the constitutionality of municipal
zoning ordinances that regulate the time, manner, and location
in which sexually-oriented businesses may operate.44 The
Court has acknowledged that the deleterious effects these busi-
nesses have on communities is a "legitimate state interest" and
may justify the direct regulation of speech.45 The leading cases
Stevens cited are Young v. American Mini Theatres46 and Schad v.
Bourough of Mt. Ephraim.47 These cases, which recognize a com-
munity's right to control the operation of X-rated establish-
43. Id. at 1929 n. 11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
47. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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ments via zoning and licensing laws, rely heavily on another
line of decisions that affirmed the constitutionality of zoning to
protect a state's substantial interest in protecting family and
privacy rights and community values.48
II. ZONING LAW PROVIDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR
THE CIVIL REGULATION OF PORNOGRAPHY
Countless local zoning ordinances exist that impinge on
first amendment rights. In Central Hudson v. Public Service Com-
mission,49 the Court held that the government's interest in con-
serving energy outweighed the gas company's free expression
right to promote, via advertising, the purchase of utility serv-
ices. Again, in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego5 the city enacted a
zoning ordinance which banned all off-site billboards. Owing
to a ban on all noncommercial billboard advertising5' the ordi-
nance was found unconstitutional. But the Court held that San
Diego's interest in furthering the city's traffic safety and aes-
thetic appearance justified an ordinance banning commercial
billboards.5 2 The use of zoning regulations, which may
infringe on constitutionally protected speech, is not a new con-
cept. One of the seminal cases, on which both Central Hudson
and Metromedia depend, is the 1954 Supreme Court decision of
Berman v. Parker.5" In Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the District of Columbia had
legitimate interest in "slum clearance and prevention" to war-
rant its condemnation of several parcels of private property.5 4
The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the act.
They argued that it was contrary to two mandates of the fifth
amendment: (1) "no person shall . . .be deprived of ... prop-
erty, without due process of law," and (2) "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, withoutjust compensation. 55
48. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1979). This line of cases held that family and privacy rights may outweigh
the competing constitutional rights of free speech and association. Because
these decisions provide substantial precedential value for the later Supreme
Court opinions of Young, Schad, and Renton, they will be discussed in Part II in
some depth.
49.. Central Hudson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980).
50. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
51. For example, banning politically oriented advertising.
52. 453 U.S. 490, 508-09.
53. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
54. Id. at 31.
55. Id. at 31.
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The district court in this case held that the act was constitu-
tional only if the District of Columbia condemned property
strictly for the purpose of ridding the city of slums.56 The
Supreme Court greatly expanded the local community's basis
for enacting zoning regulations:
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do
more than spread disease and crime and immorality.
They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing people
who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed
make living an almost insufferable burden. They may
also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community which
robs it of charm .... It is within the power of the legisla-
ture to determine that the community should be beautiful
as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced
as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the
Congress . . . [has] made determinations that take into
account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reap-
praise them. If those who govern the District of Colum-
bia decide the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as
well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment
that stands in the way.57
Many later Supreme Court opinions frequently cite Berman,
especially the cases discussed in this comment. The Berman
Court allowed legislators to consider all reasonable local values
in drafting zoning legislation. The extent and nature of these
values will be discussed in the next two cases, Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas58 and Moore v. City of East Cleveland.59 In each
case, the issue was whether a local community's interest in
upholding "family values" violated or outweighed other consti-
tutional considerations.
In Belle Terre, a New York village ordinance restricted land
use to one-family dwellings.6" The ordinance defined the word
"family" to mean one or more persons related by blood, adop-
tion, or marriage, or not more than two unrelated persons liv-
ing together as a single family unit.6 ' A number of college
students challenged the ordinance. These students, both male
and female, rented one-family units. None were related by
blood, adoption, or marriage. The owners and tenants
56. Id. at 31.
57. Id. at 32-33.
58. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
59. 431 U.S. 494 (1979).
60. 416 U.S. at 2.
61. Id.
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brought a civil rights action, suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
an injunction and a judgment declaring the ordinance uncon-
stitutional.6 2 The district court found the ordinance constitu-
tional; the Supreme Court agreed, reversing the appellate
court finding of unconstitutionality.6 3 Justice Douglas, writing
for a 7-2 majority, relied heavily on Berman v. Parker. The Court
found that the ordinance did not violate any constitutional
rights. Douglas summarized the Court's views:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and
motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a
land-use project addressed to family needs. This goal is a
permissible one within Berman v. Parker .... The police
power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and
unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where fam-
ily values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclu-
sion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.64
The legitimate state interest in promoting family values was
considered to be a substantial state interest, just the type the
zoning laws were designed to protect. In the next case, Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, the Court struck down a similar statute
that was enacted to protect family values. 65 The Court thought
the city ordinance actually "slic[ed] deeply into the family
itself."66
In Moore, the city council of East Cleveland enacted an
ordinance which they analogized to the village of Belle
Terre's. 67 The dispositive difference was that in the East
Cleveland ordinance a section existed that allowed certain
related individuals to live together in a "family" unit;6 8 the
ordinance prohibited certain relatives, including a grand-
mother and her grandchildren, from dwelling together. This
ordinance was supposedly enacted to promote family values.
But, in a plurality opinion,Justice Brennan maintained the con-
trary resulted:69 "East Cleveland, in contrast [to Belle Terre],
has chosen to regulate the occupancy of its housing by slicing
deeply into the family itself. . . . [I]t makes it a crime of a
grandmother's choice to live with her grandson in circum-
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id. at 3, 10.
64. Id. at 9.
65. 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
66. Id. at 498.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 498-99.
69. Id. at 494.
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stances like those presented here."7 The Court affirmed the
Belle Terre holding that cities may use zoning ordinances to
effectuate legitimate local goals, protect locally defined family
values, et cetera.7 ' But this ordinance denigrated family values
rather than promote them. It also violated the appellant
Moore's fundamental right of liberty, to choose with which
family member she wished to live.72
These three cases are extremely important in laying the
foundation for future zoning ordinances restricting the time,
place, and manner in which sexually-oriented businesses may
operate. In Part III of this comment, the three crucial Supreme
Court decisions of Young v. American Mini Threatres, Schad v.
Bourough of Mt. Ephraim, and Renton v. Playtime Threatres, along
with one circuit court opinion 73 will be analyzed. These deci-
sions provide the best constitutional analysis for restricting
presumptively protected pornographic expression. They also
discuss the most effective zoning and time, place, and manner
restrictions used in regulating sexually oriented businesses and
the public display of pornographic material found harmful to
minors.
III. EXAMINATION OF DECISIONS UPHOLDING STATUTES
REGULATING THE COMMERCIAL DISSEMINATION OF
PORNOGRAPHY
A. Restricting Adult Businesses
Young v. American Mini Theaters,7 is the most significant
recent Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality
of an ordinance that imposed zoning restrictions on a variety of
adult establishments. In 1972, two Detroit zoning ordinances
were enacted amending an "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance"
70. Id. at 498-99.
71. Id. at 499-500.
72. Id. at 494.
73. In FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 837 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir.), stay
granted and petition for cert. filed, 108 S.Ct. 1605 (1988), cert. granted in part, 109
S. Ct. 1309 (1989), the Court of Appeals substantially upheld the
constitutionality of the "Sexually-Oriented Businesses" ordinance. This
ordinance pervasively regulates the operation of sexually oriented businesses
in Dallas. It is appended to the district court opinion, Dumas v. City of
Dallas, 648 F.Supp. 1061 (N.D. Tex. 1986), and is included in Appendix A of
this comment. This ordinance, if upheld by the Supreme Court, will prove to
be a valuable tool for legislators in undermining the onslaught of
pornography into their community.
74. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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adopted ten years earlier. 75 These ordinances provided that
adult theaters could not be located either within one thousand
feet of any two other "regulated uses" or within five hundred
feet of a residential area.76 "Regulated uses" applies to ten dif-
ferent types of retail and entertainment establishments, includ-
ing adult book stores, cabarets, bars, taxi dance halls, and
hotels.7 7 The classification of a theater as "adult" is based on
the content of the material shown. If a theater showed films
that are characterized by an emphasis on matter relating to
"Specified Sexual Activities" or "Specified Anatomical Areas"
it is considered an adult establishment. 78 This zoning dis-
perses those types of establishments throughout the city.
The Detroit Common Council found that "some uses of
property [that is, sexually oriented businesses] are especially
injurious to a neighborhood when they are concentrated in lim-
ited areas." 79 Urban planners and real estate agents who sup-
ported the ordinance concurred: "[S]everal such [sexually
oriented] businesses in the same neighborhood tends to attract
an undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely
affects property values, causes an increase in crime, especially
prostitution, and encourages residents and business to move
elsewhere."8 0 The Court held that the substantial government
interest, that is, the preservation and stabilization of the neigh-
borhoods in the City of Detroit, outweighed the incidental
effects this ordinance would have on free expression of ideas.8 '
This ordinance did not attempt to ban sexually oriented busi-
nesses; it only restricted their location in order not to enlarge
or encourage the development of a "red light" skid row
district.8 2
The decision also indicated that, like commercial speech,
pornographic speech may receive less than full first amend-
ment protection." In fact, the Court analogized these two
forms of expression. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
first stated the basic principle that there may be no restriction
whatsoever on expressive activity because of its content;84 he
75. Id. at 54.
76. Id. at 52-55.
77. Id. at 52 n.3.
78. Id. at 50, 55.
79. Id. at 54.
80. Id. at 55.
81. Id. at 57.
82. Id. at 54 n.6.
83. Id. at 68.
84. Id.
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then cited New York Times v. Sullivan,85 however, to show that
libel determinations are content dependent. Stevens
continued:
We have recently held that the First Amendment affords
some protection to commercial speech. We have also
made it clear, however, that the content of a particular
advertisement may determine its extent of protection....
The measure of constitutional protection to be afforded
commercial speech will surely be governed by the con-
tent of the communication. 86
Based on this argument, the Court in Young concluded that
sexually explicit, albeit non-obscene speech, also may be
restricted based on its content. 87 Citing Ginsberg v. New York, 88
in which the Court upheld a conviction for selling porno-
graphic, but not legally obscene, magazines to a minor, Stevens
reasoned that the first amendment did not preclude this type of
prohibition: "[Y]et it is equally clear that any such prohibition
must rely squarely on an appraisal of the content of material
otherwise within a constitutionally protected area."89
In a more recent decision, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., ° the Court relied heavily on Young to uphold a similar
ordinance. In Renton, Washington, the city council enacted an
ordinance prohibiting any " 'adult motion picture theater' from
locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or
multiple-family dwelling, church or park, and from locating
within one mile of any school."9 The ordinance's intent and
effect, as distinguished from Detroit's, was to force all sexually-
oriented theaters into close proximity, and away from "family
oriented" dwellings.92
City of Renton is important for a number of reasons. First, it
reaffirmed the Supreme Court's approval of restrictive zoning
of sexually oriented businesses. Second, it emphasized that a
community may choose the type of zoning best suited to its
local situation. Zoning that disperses or clusters "adult" estab-
lishments are equally valid. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 7-2
majority in Renton, cited Young v. American Mini Theaters and reit-
erated this point: " '[T]he city must be allowed a reasonable
85. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
86. 427 U.S. at 68 (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 68-73.
88. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
89. 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
90. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
91. Id. at 44.
92. Id. at 52.
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opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious
problems.' "" Finally, the decision is important because the
Renton legislators, unlike those in Detroit, did not initiate any
type of study or finding in their community to determine
empirically whether these theaters had a negative impact on
their community. 4 The idea of allowing a community to
restrict without first showing its detrimental effects may seem
incongruous. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that a
community may take reasonable steps to avoid a problem with-
out waiting for that problem to develop.9 5 The Renton legisla-
tors knew that the proliferation of sexually-oriented businesses
caused urban decay:
We hold that Renton was entitled to rely on the exper-
iences of Seattle and other cities, and in particular on the
"detailed findings" [of the harmful effects of adult thea-
ters] summarized in the Washington Supreme Court's
Northend Cinema opinion, in enacting its adult theater zon-
ing ordinance. The First Amendment does not require a
city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new
studies or produce evidence independent of that already
generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence
the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant
to the problem that the city addresses. That was the case
here.
96
Some local jurisdictions have taken this opinion to heart.
Based on other cities' studies, they have enacted extensive zon-
ing ordinances restricting sexually-oriented establishments as
justification. Recently, Dallas, Texas, enacted an ordinance
regulating sexually-oriented businesses based on the findings
of Austin, Indianapolis, and Los Angeles. The Dallas legisla-
tion passed judicial scrutiny97 in 1986 and was reaffirmed in
1988. This ordinance should be considered a model ordinance
that may be employed by other communities confronted with
either a "skid row" problem or an "unsightly" red light district.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 50-53.
95. Id. at 50-55.
96. 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986). The Washington case to which the Court
referred is Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 90 Wash.2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153
(1978), cert. denied sub. nom., Apple Theatre v. Seattle, 441 U.S. 946 (1979).
97. See Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Tex. 1986), aff'd
sub nom., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 837 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988), stay
granted and petition for cert. filed, 108 S.Ct. 1605 (1988), cert. granted in part, 109
S.Ct. 1309 (1989).
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B. Public Display Legislation
Even though zoning may force adult establishments out of
town or at least out of sight, a number of businesses, such as
service stations or grocery stores, profit from selling sexually
explicit material. This material is often prominently displayed
to sexually incite, although it often disgusts, the unsuspecting
passerby. Public display legislation attempts to protect both
children and adults from this visual assault. These statutes and
ordinances do not prevent adults access to the material; they
simply prohibit the prominent display of such material deemed
"harmful to minors." Similar to the zoning legislation analyzed
in this comment, these public display laws need not address the
thorny issue of obscenity. In Ginsberg v. New York" the Court
defined "harmful to minors." As long as the legislation follows
the definition or similar language provided in Ginsberg, a state
or local community may prohibit the display of virtually all sex-
ually explicit fare.
The Ginsberg Court affirmed the following definition of
"harmful to minors." If the sexually explicit work
"(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient or shameful or
morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to
prevailing standards in the adult community as to a whole
with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for
minors.'99
Legislation can forbid the sale to minors or the display of any
material which falls within the definition. Presently, twelvel'0
states prohibit the display of sexually explicit material and fol-
low the Ginsberg "harmful to minors" language.
Many states,' like New York, simply ban the public dis-
play of certain sexual or physical activity and specified nudity
whether such public displays are legally obscene. As the com-
mentator of the New York legislation wrote: "[T]hey are not
constitutionally protected, because they are thrust indiscrimi-
nately upon unwilling audiences of adults and children, and
constitute assaults upon individual privacy."' 0 2 These laws
intend to protect the unwary and especially the innocent from
inappropriate and offensive public indecency. These laws pro-
vide needed protection for children and unsuspecting adults
98. 390 U.s. 629 (1968).
99. Id. at 633.
100. See Appendix B.
101. See Appendix C.
102. N.Y. penal 245.10 .11 (McKinney 1971).
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without unnecessarily restricting the rights of adults to view or
procure such material.
Many local communities have passed similar local ordi-
nances. Wichita and Minneapolis have enacted ordinances to
forbid the display of sexually explicit material that is harmful to
children. The state of Virginia has done likewise. Both the
Wichita and Minneapolis ordinances have passed constitutional
scrutiny in federal circuit courts; Virginia's statute very recently
was found to be constitutional in the state supreme court after
answering certain questions certified by the United States
Supreme Court. '0 3
Another tool available to local legislation to restrict the
proliferation of pornography is requiring a license to operate a
sexually-oriented business. The cost of the license can be as
high as five hundred dollars annually. It may be denied to
those with certain criminal convictions. It may also be revoked
for a violation of certain crimes. All of these restrictions are
found in the Dallas ordinance and can be used as a standard for
the constitutional limits of licensing.10 4
The following specific licensing restrictions passed consti-
tutional scrutiny and provide local law enforcement officials
with some control over who may operate an adult establish-
ment: (1) anyone who owns twenty percent or more of the busi-
ness must sign the licenses;'0 5 (2) the license may be denied if
the spouse of the applicant has been refused a license in the
past two years, or the "housemate" of the applicant has been
refused a license within the past twelve months;'0 6 (3) the
establishment may be inspected at any time by the police, fire
and health departments, the housing and neighborhood
103. The Wichita ordinance was found constitutional in U.S. News Co. v.
Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983); and the Minneapolis ordinance, in
Upper Midwest Booksellers v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir.
1985). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found a similar ordinance
unconstitutional. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Virginia, 802 F.2d 691
(4th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court, however, recently vacated this ruling
and certified two procedural questions to be answered by the state's supreme
court, Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. 636 (1988). The
Court did not attempt to decide the constitutional issues presented in
Commonwealth v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 372 S.E. 2d 618 (Va. 1988).
The Supreme Court of Virginia answered the United States Supreme Court's
certified questions and narrowly construed the statute upholding its
constitutionality. For decisions reaching contrary results based on similar
ordinances, see Tattered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley, 696 P.2d 790 (Colo. 1985),
and American Booksellers Ass'n v. Webb, 643 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
104. See Appendix A, Sexually Oriented Businesses.
105. See id. at 41A-f(d).
106. See id. at 41A-5(a)(5)-(6).
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departments, and the building inspection division;' 7 and (4)
an applicant may be refused a license if he/she or the spouse
has been convicted of any of the enumerated sexually related
crimes.'" 8 Although these regulations have been found consti-
tutional, nothing precludes an innovative legislator from pro-
viding even greater restrictions so long as the limitations
(restrictions) serve a legitimate and reasonable governmental
interest.
CONCLUSION
Ever since Roth v. United States' 09 first defined obscenity
over thirty years ago, the criminal prosecution of this material
has waned and wavered according to the current make-up of
the Supreme Court. As this comment undetfscored, the trend is
not likely to end soon. Although defining obscenity has proved
"intractable" and criminal action only somewhat effective, at
least three civil regulations have been effectively used to
restrict the location and operation of sexually oriented busi-
nesses or at least keeping this material out of sight, if not out of
town.
The Supreme Court has provided local governments with
great leeway and guidance in this area. Their decisions have
indicated a willingness to allow local governments to combat
the proliferation of X-rated establishments and material in the
manner best suited for that community. The Court also has
afforded them the constitutional ammunition to enforce these
solutions. Zoning laws, public display ordinances, and licens-
ing have passed intense judicial scrutiny; therefore, legislators
can be somewhat assured of their constitutionality. Indeed,
they can be assured of these solutions' flexibility and effective-
ness in addressing very particularized local problems.
107. See id. at 41A-7.
108. See id. at 41A-5(10)(A) prostitution; promotion of prostitution;
obscenity; sale, distribution, or display of harmful material to minors, sexual
performance by a child; possession of child pornography; public lewdness,
sexual assault, et cetera.
109. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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Location of sexually oriented businesses.
Exemption from location restrictions.
Additional regulations for escort agencies.
Additional regulations for nude model studios.
Addition regulations for adult theaters and
adult motion picture theaters.
Additional regulations for adult motels.
Regulations pertaining to exhibition of sexu-
ally explicit films or videos.
Display of sexually explicit material to minors.
Enforcement.
Injunction.
Amendment of this chapter.
CHAPTER 41A. SEXUALLY ORIENTED BUSINESSES
SEC. 41A-1. PURPOSE AND INTENT.
(a) It is the purpose of this chapter to regulate sexually
oriented businesses to promote the health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of the citizens of the city, and to establish rea-
sonable and uniform regulations to prevent the continued con-
centration of sexually oriented businesses within the city. The
provisions of this chapter have neither the purpose nor effect
of imposing a limitation or restriction on the content of any
communicative materials, including sexually oriented materi-
als. Similarly, it is not the intent nor effect of this chapter to
restrict or deny access by adults to sexually oriented materials
protected by the first amendment, or to deny access by the dis-
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tributors and exhibitors of sexually oriented entertainment to
their intended market.
(b) It is the intent of the city council that the locational
regulations of Section 41A- 13 of this chapter are promulgated
pursuant to Article 2372w, Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, as
they apply to nude model studios and sexual encounter centers
only. It is the intent of the city council that all other provisions
of this chapter are promulgated pursuant to the Dallas City




(1) ADULT ARCADE means any place to which the public
is permitted or invited wherein coin-operated or slug-operated
or electronically, electrically, or mechanically controlled still or
motion picture machines, projectors, or other image-producing
devices are maintained to show images to five or fewer persons
per machine at any one time, and where the images so dis-
played are distinguished or characterized by the depicting or
describing of "specified sexual activities" or "specified anatom-
ical areas."
(2) ADULT BOOKSTORE or ADULT VIDEO STORE
means a commercial establishment which as one of its principal
business purposes offers for sale or rental for any form of con-
sideration any one or more of the following:
(A) books, magazines, periodicals or other printed matter,
or photographs, films, motion pictures, video cassettes or video
reproductions, slides, or other visual representations which
depict or describe "specified sexual activities" or "specified
anatomical areas"; or
(B) instruments, devices, or paraphernalia which are
designed for use in connection with "specified sexual
activities."
(3) ADULT CABARET means a nightclub, bar, restau-
rant, or similar commercial establishment which regularly
features:
(A) persons who appear in a state of nudity; or
(B) live performances which are characterized by the
exposure of "specified anatomical areas" or by "specified sex-
ual activities;" or
(C) films, motion pictures, video cassettes, slides, or other
photographic reproductions which are characterized by the
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depiction or description of "specified sexual activities" or
"specified anatomical areas."
(4) ADULT MOTEL means a hotel, motel or similar com-
mercial establishment which:
(A) offers accommodations to the public for any form of
consideration; provides patrons with closed-circuit television
transmissions, films, motion pictures, video cassettes, slides, or
other photographic reproductions which are characterized by
the depiction or description of "specified sexual activities" or
"specified anatomical areas"; and has a sign visible from the
public right of way which advertises the availability of this adult
type of photographic reproductions; or
(B) offers a sleeping room for rent for a period of time
that is less than 10 hours; or
(C) allows a tenant or occupant of a sleeping room to sub-
rent the room for a period of time that is less than 10 hours.
(5) ADULT MOTION PICTURE THEATER means a
commercial establishment where, for any form of considera-
tion, films, motion pictures, video cassettes, slides, or similar
photographic reproductions are regularly shown which are
characterized by the depiction or description of "specified sex-
ual activities" or "specified anatomical areas."(6) ADULT THEATER means a theater, concert hall,-
auditorium, or similar commercial establishment which regu-
larly features persons who appear in a state of nudity or live
performances which are characterized by the exposure of
"specified anatomical areas" or by "specified sexual activities."
(7) CHIEF OF POLICE means the chief of police of the
city of Dallas or his designated agent.
(8) ESCORT means a person who, for consideration,
agrees or offers to act as a companion, guide, or date for
another person, or who agrees or offers to privately model lin-
gerie or to privately perform a striptease for another person.
(9) ESCORT AGENCY means a person or business asso-
ciation who furnishes, offers to furnish, or advertises to furnish
escorts as one of its primary business purposes, for a fee, tip, or
other consideration.
(10) ESTABLISHMENT means and includes any of the
following:
(A) the opening or commencement of any sexually ori-
ented business as a new business;
(B) the conversion of an existing business, whether or not
a sexually oriented business, to any sexually oriented business;
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(C) the addition of any sexually oriented business to any
other existing sexually oriented business; or
(D) the relocation of any sexually oriented business.
(11) LICENSEE means a person in whose name a license
to operate a sexually oriented business has been issued, as well
as the individual listed as an applicant on the application for a
license.
(12) NUDE MODEL STUDIO means any place where a
person who appears in a state of nudity or displays "specified
anatomical areas" is provided to be observed, sketched, drawn,
painted, sculptured, photographed, or similarly depicted by
other persons who pay money or any form of consideration.
(13) NUDITY or a STATE OF NUDITY means the
appearance of a human bare buttock, anus, male genitals,
female genitals, or female breast.
(14) PERSON means an individual, proprietorship, part-
nership, corporation, association, or other legal entity.
(15) SEMI-NUDE means a state of dress in which clothing
covers no more than the genitals, public region, and areolae of
the female breast, as well as portions of the body covered by
supporting straps or devices.
(16) SEXUAL ENCOUNTER CENTER means a business
or commercial enterprise that, as one of its primary business
purposes, offers for any form of consideration:
(A) physical contact in the form of wrestling or tumbling
between persons of the opposite sex; or
(B) activities between male and female persons and/or
persons of the same sex when one or more of the persons is in
a state of nudity or semi-nude.
(17) SEXUALLY ORIENTED BUSINESS means an adult
arcade, adult bookstore or adult video store, adult cabaret,
adult motel, adult motion picture theater, adult theater, escort
agency, nude model studio, or sexual encounter center.
(18) SPECIFIED ANATOMICAL AREAS means human
genitals in a state of sexual arousal.
(19) SPECIFIED SEXUAL ACTIVITIES means and
includes any of the following:
(A) the fondling or other erotic touching of human geni-
tals, public region, buttocks, anus, or female breasts;
(B) sex acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated,
including intercourse, oral copulation, or sodomy;
(C) masturbation, actual or simulated; or
(D) excretory functions as part of or in connection with
any of the activities set forth in (A) through (C) above.
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(20) SUBSTANTIAL ENLARGEMENT of a sexually ori-
ented business means the increase in floor area occupied by the
business by more than 25 percent, as the floor area exists on
June 18, 1986.
(21) TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL of a
sexually oriented business means and includes any of the
following:
(A) the sale, lease, or sublease of the business;
(B) the transfer of securities which constitute a controlling
interest in the business, whether by sale, exchange, or similar
means; or
(C) the establishment of a trust, gift, or other similar legal
device which transfers the ownership or control of the busi-
ness, except for transfer by bequest or other operation of law
upon the death of the person possessing the ownership or con-
trol. (Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-3. CLASSIFICATION.
Sexually oriented businesses are classified as follows:
(1) adult arcades;
(2) adult bookstores or adult video stores;
(3) adult cabarets;
(4) adult motels;
(5) adult motion picture theaters;
(6) adult theaters;
(7) escort agencies;
(8) nude model studios; and
(9) sexual encounter centers. (Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-4. LICENSE REQUIRED.
(a) A person commits an offense if he operates a sexually
oriented business without a valid license, issued by the city for
the particular type of business.
(b) An application for a license must be made on a form
provided by the chief of police. The application must be
accompanied by a sketch or diagram showing the configuration
of the premises, including a statement of total floor space occu-
pied by the business. The sketch or diagram need not be pro-
fessionally prepared but must be drawn to a designated scale or
drawn with marked dimensions of the interior of the premises
to an accuracy of plus or minus six inches. Applicants who
must comply with Section 41A-19 of this chapter shall submit a
diagram meeting the requirements of Section 41A-19.
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(c) The applicant must be qualified according to the provi-
sions of this chapter and the premises must be inspected and
found to be in compliance with the law by the health depart-
ment, fire department, and building official.
(d) If a person who wishes to operate a sexually oriented
business is an individual, he must sign the application for a
license as applicant. If a person who wishes to operate a sexu-
ally oriented business is other than an individual, each individ-
ual who has a 20 percent or great interest in the business must
sign the application for a license as applicant. Each applicant
must be qualified under Section 41 A-5 and each applicant shall
be considered a licensee if a license is granted.
(e) The fact that a person possesses a valid theater license,
dance hall license, or public house of amusement license does
not exempt him from the requirement of obtaining a sexually
oriented business license. A person who operates a sexually
oriented business and possesses a theater license, public house
of amusement license or dance hall license shall comply with
the requirements and provisions of this chapter as well as the
requirements and provisions of Chapter 46 and Chapter 14 of
this code when applicable. (Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-5. ISSUANCE OF LICENSE.
(a) The chief of police shall approve the issuance of a
license by the assessor and collector of taxes to an applicant
within 30 days after receipt of an application unless he finds
one or more of the following to be true:
(1) An applicant is under 18 years of age.
(2) An applicant or an applicant's spouse is overdue in his
payment to the city of taxes, fees, fines, or penalties assessed
against him or imposed upon him in relation to a sexually ori-
ented business.
(3) An applicant has failed to provide information reason-
ably necessary for issuance of the license or has falsely
answered a question or request for information on the applica-
tion form.
(4) An applicant or an applicant's spouse has been con-
victed of a violation of a provision of this chapter, other than
the offense of operating a sexually oriented business without a
license, within two years immediately preceding the applica-
tion. The fact that a conviction is being appealed shall have no
effect.
(5) An applicant is residing with a person who has been
denied a license by the city to operate a sexually oriented busi-
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ness within the preceding 12 months, or residing with a person
whose license to operate a sexually oriented business has been
revoked within the preceding 12 months.
(6) The premises to be used for the sexually oriented busi-
ness have not been approved by the health department, fire
department, and the building official as being in compliance
with applicable laws and ordinances.
(7) The license fee required by this chapter has not been
paid.
(8) An applicant has been employed in a sexually oriented
business in a managerial capacity within the preceding 12
months and has demonstrated that he is unable to operate or
manage a sexually oriented business premises in a peaceful and
law-abiding manner.
(9) An applicant or the proposed establishment is in viola-
tion of or is not in compliance with Section 41A-7, 41A-12,
41A-13, 41A-15, 41A-16, 41A-17, 41A-18, 41A-19, or 41A-20.
(10) An applicant or an applicant's spouse has been con-
victed of or is under indictment or misdemeanor information
for a crime:
(A) involving;
(i) any of the following offenses as described in Chapter
43 of the Texas Penal Code:
(aa) prostitution;
(bb) promotion of prostitution;
(cc) aggravated promotion of prostitution;
(dd) compelling prostitution;
(ee) obscenity;
(ff) sale, distribution, or display of harmful material to
minor;
(gg) sexual performance by a child;
(hh) possession of child pornography;
(ii) any of the following offenses as described in Chapter
21 of the Texas Penal Code:
(aa) public lewdness;
(bb) indecent exposure;
(cc) indecency with a child;
(iii) engaging in organized criminal activity as described in
Chapter 71 of the Texas Penal Code;
(iv) sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault as
described in Chapter 22 of the Texas Penal Code;
(v) incest, solicitation of a child, or harboring a runaway
child as described in Chapter 25 of the Texas Penal Code;
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(vi) kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping as described in
Chapter 20 of the Texas Penal Code;
(vii) robbery or aggravated robbery as described in Chap-
ter 29 of the Texas Penal Code;
(viii) bribery or retaliation as described in Chapter 36 of
the Texas Penal Code;
(ix) a violation of the Texas Controlled Substances Act or
Dangerous Drugs Act punishable as a felony, Class A misde-
meanor, or Class B misdemeanor; or
(x) criminal attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit
any of the foregoing offenses;
(B) for which:
(i) less than two years have elapsed since the date of con-
viction or the date of release from confinement imposed for the
conviction, whichever is the later date, if the conviction is of a
misdemeanor offense;
(ii) less than five years have elapsed since the date of con-
viction or the date of release from confinement for the convic-
tion, whichever is the later date, if the conviction is of a felony
offense; or
(iii) less than five years have elapsed since the date of the
last conviction or the date of release from confinement for the
last conviction, whichever is the later date, if the convictions
are of two or more misdemeanor offenses or combination of
misdemeanor offenses occurring within any 24-month period.
(b) The fact that a conviction is being appealed shall have
no effect on the disqualification of the applicant or applicant's
spouse.
(c) An applicant who has been convicted or whose spouse
has been convicted of an offense listed in Subsection (a)(10),
for which the required time period has elapsed since the date of
conviction or the date of release from confinement imposed for
the conviction, may qualify for a sexually oriented business
license only if the chief of police determines that the applicant
or applicant's spouse is present fit to operate a sexually ori-
ented business. In determining present fitness under this sec-
tion, the chief of police shall consider the following factors
concerning the applicant or applicant's spouse, whichever had
the criminal conviction:
(1) the extent and nature of his past criminal activity;
(2) his age at the time of the commission of the crime;
(3) the amount of time that has elapsed since his last crim-
inal activity;
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(4) his conduct and work activity prior to and following
the criminal activity;
(5) evidence of his rehabilitation or rehabilitative effort
while incarcerated or following release; and
(6) other evidence of his present fitness, including letters
of recommendation from prosecution, law enforcement, and
correctional officers who prosecuted, arrested, or had custodial
responsibility for him; the sheriff and chief of police in the com-
munity where he resides; and any other persons in contact with
him.
(d) It is the responsibility of the applicant, to the extent
possible, to secure and provide to the chief of police the evi-
dence required to determine present fitness under Subsection
(c) of this section.
(e) The license, if granted, shall state on its face the name
of the person or persons to whom it is granted, the expiration
date, and the address of the sexually oriented business. The
license shall be posted in a conspicuous place at or near the
entrance to the sexually oriented business so that it may be eas-
ily read at any time. (Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-6. FEES.
(a) The annual fee for a sexually oriented business license
is $500.
(b) If an applicant is required by this code to also obtain a
dance hall license or public house of amusement license for the
business at a single location, payment of the fee for the sexually
oriented business license exempts the applicant from payment
of the fees for the dance hall or public house of amusement
licenses. (Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-7. INSPECTION.
(a) An applicant or licensee shall permit representatives of
the police department, health department, fire department,
housing and neighborhood services department and building
inspection division to inspect the premises of a sexually ori-
ented business for the purpose of insuring compliance with the
law, at any time it is occupied or open for business.
(b) A person who operates a sexually oriented business or
his agent or employee commits an offense if he refuses to per-
mit a lawful inspection of the premises by a representative of
the police department at any time it is occupied or open for
business. (Ord. 19196)
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SEC. 41A-8. EXPIRATION OF LICENSE.
(a) Each license shall expire one year from the date of
issuance and may be renewed only by making application as
provided in Section 4 1A-4. Application for renewal should be
made at least 30 days before the expiration date, and when
made less than 30 days before the expiration date, the expira-
tion of the license will not be affected.
(b) When the chief of police denies renewal of a license,
the applicant shall not be issued a license for one year from the
date of denial. If, subsequent to denial, the chief of police finds
that the basis for denial of the renewal license has been cor-
rected or abated, the applicant may be granted a license if at
least 90 days have elapsed since the date denial became final.
(Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-9. SUSPENSION.
The chief of police shall suspend a license for a period not
to exceed 30 days if he determines that a licensee or an
employee of a licensee has:
(1) violated or is not in compliance with Section 41A-7,
41A-12, 41A-13, 41A-15, 41A-16, 41A-17, 41A-18, 41A-19, or
41A-20 of this chapter;
(2) engaged in excessive use of alcoholic beverages while
on the sexually oriented business premises;
(3) refused to allow an inspection of the sexually oriented
business premises as authorized by this chapter;
(4) knowingly permitted gambling by any person on the
sexually oriented business premises;
(5) demonstrated inability to operate or manage a sexually
oriented business in a peaceful and law-abiding manner thus
necessitating action by law enforcement officers. (Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-10. REVOCATION.
(a) The chief of police shall revoke a license if a cause of
suspension in Section 41A-9 occurs and the license has been
suspended within the preceding 12 months.
(b) The chief of police shall revoke a license if he deter-
mines that:
(1) a licensee gave false or misleading information in the
material submitted to the chief of police during the application
process;
(2) a licensee or an employee has knowingly allowed pos-
session, use, or sale of controlled substances on the premises;
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(3) a licensee or an employee has knowingly allowed pros-
titution on the premises;
(4) a licensee or an employee knowingly operated the sex-
ually oriented business during a period of time when the licen-
see's license was suspended;
(5) a licensee has been convicted of an offense listed in
Section 41A-6(a)(10)(A) for which the time period required in
Section 41A-5(a)(10)(B) has not elapsed;
(6) on two or more occasions within a 12-month period, a
person or persons committed an offense occurring in or on the
licensed premises of a crime listed in Section 41A-5(a)(10)(A),
for which a conviction has been obtained, and the person or
persons were employees of the sexually oriented business at
the time the offenses were committed;
(7) a licensee or an employee has knowingly allowed any
act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, masturba-
tion, or sexual contact to occur in or on the licensed premises.
The term "sexual contact" shall have the same meaning as it is
defined in Section 21.01, Texas Penal Code; or
(8) a licensee is delinquent in payment to the city for hotel
occupancy taxes, ad valorem taxes, or sales taxes related to the
sexually oriented business.
(c) The fact that a conviction is being appealed shall have
no effect on the revocation of the license.
(d) Subsection (b)(7) does not apply to adult motels as a
ground for revoking the license.
(e) When the chief of police revokes a license, the revoca-
tion shall continue for one year and the licensee shall not be
issued a sexually oriented business license for one year from
the date revocation became effective. If, subsequent to revoca-
tion, the chief of police finds that the basis for the revocation
has been corrected or abated, the applicant may be granted a
license if at least 90 days have elapsed since the date the revo-
cation became effective. If the license was revoked under Sub-
section (b)(5), an applicant may not be granted another license
until the appropriate number of years required under Section
41A-5(a)(10)(B) has elapsed since the termination of any sen-
tence, parole, or probation. (Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-11. APPEAL.
If the chief of police denies the issuance of a license, or
suspends or revokes a license, he shall send to the applicant, or
licensee, by certified mail, return receipt requested, written
notice of his action and the right to an appeal. The aggrieved
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party may appeal the decision of the chief of police to a permit
and license appeal board in accordance with Section 2-96 of
this code. The filing of an appeal stays the action of the chief of
police in suspending or revoking a license until the permit and
license appeal board makes a final decision. If within a 10 day
period the chief of police suspends, revokes, or denies issuance
of a dance hall license or public house of amusement license
for the same location involved in the chief's actions on the sex-
ually oriented business license, then the chief may consolidate
the requests for appeals of those actions into one appeal. (Ord.
19196)
SEC. 41A-12. TRANSFER OF LICENSE.
A licensee shall not transfer his license to another, nor
shall a licensee operate a sexually oriented business under the
authority of a license at any place other than the address desig-
nated in the application. (Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-13. LOCATION OF SEXUALLY ORIENTED
BUSINESSES.
(a) A person commits an offense if he operates or causes
to be operated a sexually oriented business within 1,000 feet
of:
(1) a church;
(2) a public or private elementary or secondary school;
(3) a boundary of a residential district as defined by the
Dallas Development Code;
(4) a public park adjacent to a residential district as
defined by the Dallas Development Code; or
(5) the property line of a lot devoted to residential use.
(b) A person commits an offense if he causes or permits
the operation, establishment, substantial enlargement, or
transfer of ownership or control of a sexually oriented business
within 1,000 feet of another sexually oriented business.
(c) A person commits an offense if he causes or permits
the operation, establishment, or maintenance of more than one
sexually oriented business in the same building, structure, or
portion thereof, or the increase of floor area of any sexually
oriented business in any building, structure or portion thereof
containing another sexually oriented business.
(d) For the purposes of Subsection (a), measurement shall
be made in a straight line, without regard to intervening struc-
tures or objects from the nearest portion of the building or
structure used as a part of the premises where a sexually ori-
ADULT BUSINESSES
ented business is conducted, to the nearest property line of the
premises of a church or public or private elementary or secon-
dary school, or to the nearest boundary of an affected public
park, residential district, or residential lot.
(e) For purposes of Subsection (b) of this section, the dis-
tance between any two sexually oriented businesses shall be
measured in a straight line, without regard to intervening struc-
tures or objects, from the closest exterior wall of the structure
in which each business is located.
(f) Any sexually oriented business lawfully operating on
June 18, 1986, that is in violation of Subsections (a), (b), or (c)
of this section shall be deemed a nonconforming use. The
nonconforming use will be permitted to continue for a period
not to exceed three years, unless sooner terminated for any
reason or voluntarily discontinued for a period of 30 days or
more. Such nonconforming uses shall not be increased,
enlarged, extended or altered except that the use may be
changed to a conforming use. If two or more sexually oriented
businesses are within 1,000 feet of one another and otherwise
in a permissible location, the sexually oriented business which
was first established and continually operating at a particular
location is the conforming use and the later-established busi-
ness(es) is nonconforming.
(g) A sexually oriented business lawfully operating as a
conforming use is not rendered a nonconforming use by the
location, subsequent to the grant or renewal of the sexually ori-
ented business license, of a church, public or private elemen-
tary or secondary school, public park, residential district, or
residential lot within 1,000 feet of the sexually oriented busi-
ness. This provision applies only to the renewal of a valid
license, and does not apply when an application for a license is
submitted after a license has expired or has been revoked.
(Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-14. EXEMPTION FROM LOCATION
RESTRICTIONS.
(a) If the chief of police denies the issuance of a license to
an applicant because the location of the sexually oriented busi-
ness establishment is in violation of Section 41A-13 of this
chapter, then the applicant may, not later than 10 calendar days
after receiving notice of the denial, file with the city secretary a
written request for an exemption from the locational restric-
tions of Section 41A-13.
(b) If the written request is filed with the city secretary
within the 10-day limit, a permit and license appeal board,
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selected in accordance with Section 2-95 of this code, shall con-
sider the request. The city secretary shall set a date for the
hearing within 60 days from the date the written request is
received.
(c) A hearing by the board may proceed if at least two of
the board members are present. The board shall hear and con-
sider evidence offered by any interested person. The formal
rules of evidence do not apply.
(d) The permit and license appeal board may, in its discre-
tion, grant an exemption from the locational restrictions of
Section 41A-13 if it makes the following findings:
(1) that the location of the proposed sexually oriented
business will not have a detrimental effect on nearby properties
or be contrary to the public safety or welfare.
(2) that the granting of the exemption will not violate the
spirit and intent of this chapter of the city code;
(3) that the location of the proposed sexually oriented
business will not downgrade the property values or quality of
life in the adjacent areas or encourage the development of
urban blight;
(4) that the location of an additional sexually oriented
business in the area will not be contrary to any program of
neighborhood conservation nor will it interfere with any efforts
of urban renewal or restoration; and
(5) that all other applicable provisions of this chapter will
be observed.
(e) The board shall grant or deny the exemption by a
majority vote. Failure to reach a majority vote shall result in
denial of the exemption. Disputes of fact shall be decided on
the basis of a preponderance of the evidence. The decision of
the permit and license appeal board is final.
(f) If the board grants the exemption, the exemption is
valid for one year from the date of the board's action. Upon
the expiration of an exemption, the sexually oriented business
is in violation of the locational restrictions of Section 41A-13
until the applicant applies for and receives another exemption.
(g) If the board denies the exemption, the applicant may
not re-apply for an exemption until at least 12 months have
elapsed since the date of the board's action.
(h) The grant of an exemption does not exempt the appli-
cant from any other provisions of this chapter other than the
locational restrictions of Section 41A-13. (Ord. 19196)
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SEC. 41A-15. ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS FOR ESCORT
AGENCIES.
(a) An escort agency shall not employ any person under
the age of 18 years.
(b) A person commits an offense if he acts as an escort or
agrees to act as an escort for any person under the age of 18
years. (Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-16. ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS FOR NUDE
MODEL STUDIOS.
(a) A nude model studio shall not employ any person
under the age of 18 years.
(b) A person under the age of 18 years commits an offense
if he appears in a state of nudity in or on the premises of a nude
model studio. It is a defense to prosecution under this subsec-
tion if the person under 18 years was in a restroom not open to
public view or persons of the opposite sex.
(c) A person commits an offense if he appears in a state of
nudity or knowingly allows another to appear in a state of
nudity in an area of a nude model studio premises which can be
viewed from the public right of way.
(d) A nude model studio shall not place or permit a bed,
sofa, or mattress in any room on the premises, except that a
sofa may be placed in a reception room open to the public.
(Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-17. ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS FOR ADULT
THEATERS AND ADULT MOTION PICTURE THEATERS.
(a) The requirements and provisions of Chapter 46 of this
code remain applicable to adult theaters and adult motion pic-
ture theaters.
(b) A person commits an offense if he knowingly allows a
person under the age of 18 years to appear in a state of nudity
in or on the premises of an adult theater or adult motion pic-
ture theater.
(c) A person under the age of 18 years commits an offense
if he knowingly appears in a state of nudity in or on the prem-
ises of an adult theater or adult motion picture theater.
(d) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsections (b)
and (c) of this section if the person under 18 years was in a
restroom not open to public view or persons of the opposite
sex. (Ord. 19196)
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SEC. 41A-18. ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS FOR ADULT
MOTELS.
(a) Evidence that a sleeping room in a hotel, motel, or
similar commercial establishment has been rented and vacated
two or more times in a period of time that is less than 10 hours
creates a rebuttable presumption that the establishment is an
adult motel as that term is defined in this chapter.
(b) A person commits an offense if, as the person in con-
trol of a sleeping room in a hotel, motel, or similar commercial
establishment that does not have a sexually oriented business
license, he rents or subrents a sleeping room to a person and
within 10 hours from the time the room is rented, he rents or
subrents the same sleeping room again.
(c) For purposes of Subsection (b) of this section, the
terms "rent" or "subrent" mean the act of permitting a room
to be occupied for any form of consideration. (Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-19. REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO EXHIBI-
TION OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT FILMS OR VIDEOS.
(a) A person who operates or causes to be operated a sex-
ually oriented business, other than an adult motel, which exhib-
its on the premises in a viewing room of less than 150 square
feet of floor space, a film, video cassette, or other video repro-
duction which depicts specified sexual activities or specified
anatomical areas, shall comply with the following
requirements:
(1) Upon application for a sexually oriented business
license, the application shall be accompanied by a diagram of
the premises showing a plan thereof specifying the location of
one or more manager's stations and the location of all over-
head lighting fixtures and designating any portion of the prem-
ises in which patrons will not be permitted. A manager's
station may not exceed 32 square feet of floor area. The dia-
gram shall also designate the place at which the permit will be
conspicuously posted, if granted. A professionally prepared
diagram in the nature of an engineer's or architect's blueprint
shall not be required; however each diagram should be ori-
ented to the north or to some designated street or object and
should be drawn to a designated scale or with marked dimen-
sions sufficient to show the various internal dimensions of all
areas of the interior of the premises to an accuracy of plus or
minus six inches. The chief of police may waive the foregoing
diagram for renewal applications if the applicant adopts a dia-
gram that was previously submitted and certifies that the con-
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figuration of the premises has not been altered since it was
prepared.
(2) The application shall be sworn to be true and correct
by the applicant.
(3) No alteration in the configuration or location of a man-
ager's station may be made without the prior approval of the
chief of police or his designee.
(4) It is the duty of the owners and operator of the prem-
ises to ensure that at least one employee is on duty and situated
in each manager's station at all times that any patron is present
inside the premises.
(5) The interior of the premises shall be configured in
such a manner that there is an unobstructed view from a man-
ager's station of every area of the premises to which any patron
is permitted access for any purpose excluding restrooms.
Restrooms may not contain video reproduction equipment. If
the premises has two or more manager's stations designated,
then the interior of the premises shall be configured in such a
manner that there is an unobstructed view of each area of the
premises to which any patron is permitted access for any pur-
pose from at least one of the manager's stations. The view
required in this subsection must be by direct line of sight from
the manager's station.
(6) It shall be the duty of the owners and operator, and it
shall also be the duty of any agents and employees present in
the premises to ensure that the view area specified in Subsec-
tion (5) remains unobstructed by any doors, walls, merchan-
dise, display racks or other materials at all times that any
patron is present in the premises and to ensure that no patron
is permitted access to any area of the premises which has been
designated as an area in which patrons will not be permitted in
the application filed pursuant to Subsection (1) of this section.
(7) The premises shall be equipped with overhead lighting
fixtures of sufficient intensity to illuminate every place to which
patrons are permitted access at an illumination of not less than
one (1.0) footcandle as measured at the floor level.
(8) It shall be the duty of the owners and operator and it
shall also be the duty of any agents and employees present in
the premises to ensure that the illumination described above, is
maintained at all times that any patron is present in the
premises.
(b) A person having a duty under Subsections (1) through
(8) of Subsection (a) above commits an offense if he knowingly
fails to fulfill that duty. (Ord. 19196)
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SEC. 41A-20. DISPLAY OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT MATE-
RIAL TO MINORS.
(a) A person commits an offense if, in a business establish-
ment open to persons under the age of 17 years, he displays a
book, pamphlet, newspaper, magazine, film, or video cassette,
the cover of which depicts, in a manner calculated to arouse
sexual lust or passion for commercial gain or to exploit sexual
lust or perversion for commercial gain, any of the following:
(1) human sexual intercourse, masturbation, or sodomy;
(2) fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals,
pubic region, buttocks, or female breasts;
(3) less than completely and opaquely covered human
genitals, buttocks, or that portion of the female breast below
the top of the areola; or
(4) human male genitals -in a discernibly turgid state,
whether covered or uncovered.
(b) In this section "display" means to locate an item in
such a manner that, without obtaining assistance from an
employee of the business establishment:
(1) it is available to the general public for handling and
inspection; or
(2) the cover or outside packaging on the item is visible to
members of the general public. (Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-21. ENFORCEMENT.
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), any person vio-
lating Section 41A-13 of this chapter, upon conviction, is pun-
ishable by a fine not to exceed $1,000.
(b) If the sexually oriented business involved is a nude
model studio or sexual encounter center, then violation of Sec-
tion 41A-4(a) or 41A-13 of this chapter is punishable as a Class
B misdemeanor.
(c) Except as provided by Subsection (b), any person vio-
lating a provision of this chapter other than Section 41A-13,
upon conviction, is punishable by a fine not to exceed $200.
(d) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 41A-4(a),
41A-13, or 41A-16(d) that a person appearing in a state of
nudity did so in a modeling class operated:
(1) by a proprietary school licensed by the state of Texas;
a college, junior college, or university supported entirely or
partly by taxation;
(2) by a private college or university which maintains and
operates educational programs in which credits are transfer-
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rable to a college, junior college, or university supported
entirely or partly by taxation; or
(3) in a structure:
(A) which has no sign visible from the exterior of the
structure and no other advertising that indicates a nude person
is available for viewing; and
(B) where in order to participate in a class a student must
enroll at least three days in advance of the class; and
(C) where no more than one nude model is on the prem-
ises at any one time.
(e) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 41A-4(a)
or Section 41A-13 that each item of descriptive, printed, film,
or video material offered for sale or rental, taken as a whole,
contains serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
(Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-22. INJUNCTION.
A person who operates or causes to be operated a sexually
oriented business without a valid license or in violation of Sec-
tion 41A-13 of this chapter is subject to a suit for injunction as
well as prosecution for criminal violations. (Ord. 19196)
SEC. 41A-23. AMENDMENT OF THIS CHAPTER.
Sections 41A-13 and 41A-14 of this chapter may be
amended only after compliance with the procedure required to
amend a zoning ordinance. Other sections of this chapter may
be amended by vote of the city council. (Ord. 19196)
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APPENDIX B
Ala. Code. Sections 13A-12-170, -171 (includes "display"
provision)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sections 13-3501, -3506, -3507 (includes
"display")
Col. Rev. Stat. Sections 18-7-501, -502 (includes display)
Fla. Stat. Ann. Sections 847.0125, 847.013 (includes display)
Ga. Code Ann. Sections 16-12-101 to 105 (includes display)
Ind. Code Section 35-49-3-3 (includes display)
N.C. Gen. Stat. Sections 14-190.13 to .15 (includes display)
N.M. Stat. Ann. Sections 30-3701, -2 (includes display)
N.D. Cent. Code Section 12.1-27.1-03.1 (includes display)
R.I. Gen. Laws Section 11-31-10 (includes display)
Va. Code Section 18.2-391 (includes display)
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, Section 2804b (includes display)
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APPENDIX C
Arkansas Stat. Ann. Sections 41-3581 to 3583 (exhibition only)
Cal. Penal Code Sections 313, 313.1 (distribution only)
Conn. Gen. Stat. Sections 53a-193, -196 (distribution only)
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, Section 1365 (includes display)
Hawaii Rev. Stat. Sections 712-1215 (distribution only)
Idaho Code Sections 18-1515 (distribution only)
Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 38, Section 11-21 (distribution only)
Iowa Code sections 728.1, .2, .3 (prohibits exhibition to minors
of material obscene as to adults)
Kan. Stat. Ann. Sections 21-4301a (prohibits exhibition to
minors of material obscene as to adults)
Ky. Rev. Stat. Sections 531.010, .020, .030 (prohibits exhibi-
tion to minors of material obscene as to adults)
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 14:91.11 (includes display)
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, Sections 2911 (includes display)
Md. Ann. Code Art. 27, Sections 416D, 419 (prohibits display)
Mas. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 272, Section 28 (distribution only)
Mich. Comp. Laws Sections 28.337 to .338 (prohibits exhibi-
tion to children of material obscene as to adults)
Minn. Stat. Ann. Sections 617.293 (distribution only)
Miss. Code. Ann. Sections 97-5-27, -29 (includes display)
Mo. Ann. Stat. Sections 573.040, -.060 (includes display)
Mont. Code Ann. Sections 45-8-202 (includes display)
Neb. Rev. Stat. Sections 28-808 (includes display)
Nev. Rev. Stat. Sections 201.256 to .265 (includes display)
N.H. Rev. Stat. 571-B:1, -B:2 (distribution only)
N.J. Stat. Ann. Sections 2C:34-3, 34-4 (includes display)
N.Y. Penal Law Sections 245.10, .11 (includes display)
Ohio Rev. Code Sections 2907.31 (distribution only)
Or. Rev. Stat. Sections 167.075, .080 (prohibits the distribution
or display to minors of material obscene as to adults)
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. Section 5903 (distribution only)
S.C. Ann. Sections 15-14-260, -290, -390 (includes display)
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. Sections 22-24-27, -29, -29.1, -30
(includes display)
Tenn. Code. Ann. Section 39-6-1136 (includes display)
Tex. Penal Code Ann. Section 43.24 (includes display)
Utah Code Ann. Sections 76-10-1206 (distribution only)
W. Va. Code Sections 61-8A-1, -2 (prohibits exhibition or dis-
play to minors of material obscene as to adults)
Wis. Stat. Ann. Section 944.25 (distribution only)
Wy. Stat. Sections 6-4-301, -302 (prohibits exhibition to minors
of material obscene as to adults)
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